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Abstract
Recent events in several countries have underscored the impor-
tance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The
present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of residual
claims and control rights in private pensions. The residual claimant is
the plan sponsor in a defined benefit (DB) plan and the pool of bene-
ficiaries in a defined contribution (DC) plan. The main control rights
we examine relate to decisions on funding, asset allocation, and asset
management. Under complete contracting, governance can be shown
to be neutral: DC and DB plans diﬀer only on risk allocation. If in-
stead contracts are incomplete, a DB (DC) plan should: (1) Assign
more vigilance responsibility to the sponsor (beneficiaries); (2) Rely
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less (more) on trustees; (3) Tend to employ trustees that are profes-
sional experts (caring insiders); (4) Assign asset allocation rights to
the sponsor (beneficiaries); (5) have strict funding requirements.
1 Introduction
Until recently, most policy debates on pensions — especially in Europe — fo-
cused on public responsibilities and the diﬃculties that many publicly funded
schemes have in meeting their obligations. However, recent events, not least
declines in stock markets, have increased the salience of such issues in pri-
vately funded pensions. This has major implications for countries, such as
the U.S. and U.K. which have already gone heavily down the private funding
route. However, it may also aﬀect the attractiveness of this option as an
alternative to public funding. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) estimates that US companies have accumulated pension deficits of
around 300 billion dollars. In the UK, Morgan Stanley estimates that the
aggregate pension deficit of the FTSE 100 companies in the end of 2002 is
65 billion pounds. Serious deficits are also reported in private occupational
plans in Germany and the Netherlands.
It is tempting to view the woes of privately funded pensions as an exoge-
nous event driven by the world-wide shift in investor confidence. However,
this is at best an incomplete picture. It is clear cut that there is significant
variation in the performance of pension plans subject to the same market
conditions. Moreover, there has been an increasing focus on pension plans
whose poor performance can be attributed to firms’ excessive investment in
own stock. When ENRON failed, its employees lost not only their job but
also most of their pension assets, of which over 60% was invested in EN-
RON stocks. This suggests that a full understanding on the issues needs
to understand the framework in which investment and funding decisions are
made.
These issues should be in seen in the context of the shift from defined
benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) pension plans (Poterba et al. [16]).
In the US, contributions to 401(k) plans (the main form of DC scheme)
amounted to 18% of total contributions in 1985. Today, they make up over
80% of the total. In the UK, this shift has been both more recent and more
dramatic. Since 2001 scores of companies have closed down their DB plan
to new entrants and, in some case, they have dismantled existing DB plans.
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